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Recent empirical work demonstrates that healthy people make large mistakes when evaluating
the welfare of those suffering from apparently serious health problems. Signiﬁcant adverse
conditions often inﬂict little or no hedonic damage—sometimes because people adapt to
them, and sometimes because those who suffer many losses do not, after a time, focus on
them. These ﬁndings have important implications for the legal system, especially for awards
for pain, suffering, and hedonic losses, where juries are likely to overestimate the effect of
injuries on happiness. There are two important qualiﬁcations. First, some injuries, such as
chronic pain, do inﬂict signiﬁcant hedonic losses because people cannot adapt and inevitably
focus on them. Second, people may suffer capability loss without suffering hedonic loss, and
that loss should be compensable. The legal system might be improved by civil damages
guidelines to correct hedonic judgment errors by juries. Broader implications include the
appropriate priorities for governments attempting to improve the welfare of their citizens.
Nothing in life matters quite as much as you think it does while
you are thinking about it. [Kahneman and Thaler 2006, p.
229]
1. SIX CLAIMS
In this essay I attempt to defend six principal claims:
1. In advance, people greatly exaggerate the hedonic effects of many
adverse events, largely because they do not anticipate their remarkable
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capacity to adapt to changes. This capacity stems in part from a dis-
tinctive feature of human attention: those who suffer many losses do
not focus, constantly or much, on those losses. It follows that many
losses are illusory or at least exaggerated, in the sense that they inﬂict
far less hedonic damage than people anticipate.
2. Both juries and judges are likely to make hedonic judgment er-
rors, in a way that produces inﬂated damage awards. One reason for
these errors is that in evaluating losses, observers suffer from adaptation
neglect; another reason is that the legal system asks juries and judges to
focus on, and thus to attend to, losses to which plaintiffs might well
devote little attention in their ordinary lives. In short, the legal system
almost certainly produces focusing illusions in tort cases.
3. It is important for the legal system to distinguish between harms
that impose enduring losses, such as chronic pain and mental illness,
and harms that do not, such as losses of ﬁngers and toes. The distinction
between enduring and illusory losses—for which ringing in the ears and
loss of toes are illustrative cases—has many implications for economic
and regulatory policy.
4. Without acknowledging that it is doing so, the legal system ap-
pears to be awarding capability damages under the name of hedonic
damages. Juries award damages for the loss of capabilities, even in con-
texts in which people are not suffering a loss in the enjoyment of their
lives. It is not clear whether jurors are explicitly aware of the importance
of capabilities or whether they are instead making hedonic judgment
errors.
5. It would be desirable to reform the legal system with the aid of
a civil damages schedule, designed to accomplish three distinctive tasks:
translating hedonic losses into monetary terms, correcting hedonic judg-
ment errors, and assessing capability damages where appropriate.
6. An understanding of hedonic judgment errors raises the serious
possibility that many policies, both ﬁscal and regulatory, are ill directed.
Government might be expending resources in the false hope that the
expenditures will improve well-being. There are complex questions,
however, about the relationships among hedonic effects, capabilities,
meaning, and the ingredients of good lives. A sensible society is not
concerned only about “happiness” or even subjective well-being, al-
though both of these certainly matter.
in June 2007; George Loewenstein and Peter Ubel provided especially helpful comments.
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Now for the details.
2. DOLLARS AND WELFARE
The legal system must often assign monetary values to actual or apparent
welfare losses. When those losses are purely monetary, the assignment
need not be difﬁcult. If a defendant has deprived a plaintiff of $10,000,
the legal system will require the defendant to pay $10,000totheplaintiff.
But the legal system has a great deal of difﬁculty in turning some welfare
losses into monetary equivalents.
2.1. Doctrine
Suppose that Jones has lost the use of two toes, or that Smith has become
blind, or that Wilson has been paralyzed from the waist down, or that
Holmes has developed a high degree of posttrauma anxiety, or that
Johnson has been subject to racial harassment, or that Benson has suf-
fered a loss of cognitive capacity, or that Dickersonhasbecomeimpotent.
The legal system allows people to recover for pain and suffering. The
adverse effects captured in the idea of pain and suffering areundoubtedly
real, and the legal system should attempt to deter them and to provide
compensation. Indeed, hedonic losses are often the most serious injuries
that people face—far more serious than strictly economic losses. But the
resulting damage awards are notoriously variable (Leebron 1989), and
it is not clear that they are in any sense rational or coherent (Viscusi
1988; Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein 1989; Rodgers 1993). An initial
problem, which I will explore below, is that of the extreme difﬁculty of
translating pain and suffering into monetary equivalents.
In many states, people are also permitted to recover hedonic damages,
designed to capture people’s loss of enjoyment of their lives. The line
between pain and suffering on the one hand and hedonic damages on
the other can be obscure; events that impose suffering also impose he-
donic losses. The basic distinction is that hedonic damages cover not
afﬁrmative distress or suffering but forgone gains, as when people are
unable to engage in valued activities, such as athletics (see Day v. Oua-
chita Parish School Bd., 823 So. 2d 1039, 1044 [La. Ct. App. 2002];
Allen v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 241 F.3d 1293, 1297 [10th Cir. 2001]).
Hedonic damages might be sought, for example, for the loss of a dog
(see, for example, Campell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Haw. 557,
632 P.2d 1066 [Haw. 1981]; Knowles Animal Hosp. v. Wills,3 6 0S o .
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2d 37 [Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978]), for the inability to engage in sexual
relations (see Varnell v. Louisiana Tech University, 709 So. 2d 890, 896
[La. Ct. App. 1998]), for the loss of a limb (see Pierce v. N.Y. Cent.
R.R. Co., 409 F.2d 1392 [Mich. 1969]; Matos v. Clarendon Nat. Ins.
Co., 808 So. 2d 841, 849 [La. Ct. App. 2002]), for the loss of use of
an elbow (see Kirk v. Wash. State Univ., 746 P. 2d 285, 292 [Wash.
1987]), for depression and self-consciousness as a result of amputation
of an arm (see Coleman v. Deno, 832 So. 2d 1016 [La. Ct. App. 2002]),
for reduced cognitive capacity or mental retardation (see Nemmers v.
United States, 681 F. Supp. 567 [C.D. Ill. 1988]), or for becoming bed-
ridden and thus requiring constant care (see Berla, Brookshire,andSmith
1990). Here too, it is extremely difﬁcult to translate the relevant interest
into monetary equivalents.
Even before the translation occurs, juries and judges investigating
hedonic damages and pain and suffering are asked, in a sense, to serve
as “hedometers,” assessing the adverse welfare effects associated with
one or another loss. For purposes of analysis, I shall henceforth refer to
both pain and suffering and hedonic damages as “hedonic losses,” while
recognizing that the principles behind them are distinct. The idea of
hedonic losses is meant to capture the utility or (subjective)welfarelosses
produced by some adverse event. I use the term “hedonic” to underline
the connection with the emerging literature attempting to measure he-
donic effects; the word “utility,” understood in the standard way, would
work equally well.
Of course it is reasonable to ask about the theory on which the
relevant judgments of judges and juries are supposed to be based. As
the law now stands, the working theory is one of appropriate compen-
sation or “making whole”—with the understanding that the compen-
satory award is supposed to restore plaintiffs to the hedonic state, or
the level of welfare, that they would have occupied if the injury had not
occurred (for discussion, see McCaffery, Kahneman, and Spitzer 1995).
Under appropriate assumptions, the award of compensation, properly
calculated, will also create the right deterrent signal, and hence accurate
awards will promote social welfare as well. If those who are harmed
seek and receive compensation, compensatory and deterrentgoalsshould
generally march hand in hand. As we shall see, however, the two goals
often diverge—as when a monetary award for serious pain, or chronic
headaches, does little or nothing to make the plaintiff “whole” but does
deter the kinds of acts that create serious pain or chronic headaches. In
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such cases, an award that is hard to defend in compensatory terms might
nonetheless be justiﬁed as a means of promoting optimal deterrence.
2.2. Measurement
How can judges and juries possibly serve as hedometers, lacking as they
do direct access to people’s experience? On a standard economic ap-
proach, the legal system should start with willingness to pay (WTP) (see,
for example, Viscusi 1998). As we shall see, WTP might well reﬂect a
hedonic forecasting error, in a way that complicates standard arguments
for cost-beneﬁt analysis as well as legal awards. But even if a forecasting
error is not involved, there is no obvious way to ascertain the relevant
amounts. Courts might ask, “How much would people pay to reduce a
risk of some injury?” Suppose that Jones faces a 1/200,000 risk of losing
his dog, of becoming impotent, or of being paralyzed from the waist
down. How much would Jones pay to eliminate that risk? A method of
this kind is used in the context of mortality risks, where the value of a
statistical life (VSL) is ascertained by asking about monetary valuation
as measured by reference to WTP (Viscusi 1994). Either revealed pref-
erence or contingent valuation studies might be used for this purpose.
But this approach is barred in tort cases (Viscusi 1988), which ask
not about valuation of risks but instead about injuries after they occur.
Technically, of course, the answer to the two questions might well turn
out to be identical. If Jones would be willing to pay $10 to eliminate a
1/200,000 chance of losing his dog, the loss of his dog would seem to
be worth $2 million. But this statement of equivalence raises many ques-
tions, at least if it is meant to capture actual behavior. Risk aversion,
risk seeking, and various cognition distortions might ensure that people
would pay far less, or far more, than $10 to avoid a risk of 1/200,000,
even if the ultimate loss would be worth $2 million. In any case it is far
from clear that most people would produce a monetary ﬁgure for a
1/200,000 risk of some injury, such as the loss of an arm, equal to
1/200,000 the amount that they would produce for a certainty of the
same injury.
To assess hedonic damages, courts might be inclined to ask, “How
much would people have to be paid to incur the relevant loss?” The
question might be how much people would demand to give up three
ﬁngers, or two toes, or sexual capacities, or the use of an arm. This
question is often described as involving “willingness to accept,” or WTA
(see Korobkin 2003). But the legal system bans courts from asking the
WTA question, whether it is phrased in terms of WTA to face risks or
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WTA to face actual losses (see McCafferey, Kahneman, and Spitzer
1995). There are two possible reasons, involving loss aversion and hu-
miliation. Both of these may mean that people’s WTA would beexcessive
if measured against the loss.
It is well established that people are highly averse to losses, in the
sense that they will demand more to give up a good than they would
be willing to pay to obtain that good in the ﬁrst instance (see Thaler
1991). By itself, this point does not establish that WTA is the wrong
measure; perhaps people’s WTA more accurately captures the welfare
loss than WTP (for a good discussion, see Korobkin 2003). But evidence
suggests that loss aversion may well reﬂect a hedonic forecasting error:
people greatly exaggerate the actual hedonic harms associated with a
loss from the status quo (see Kermer et al. 2006). If the baseline is actual
experience, then loss aversion is a mistake, because people are predicting
a level of hedonic loss that they will not actually experience. And if this
is so, then the WTA question is the wrong one; people’s answers will
not map onto the actual harm once the loss comes to fruition. In prin-
ciple, the actual harm should provide the standard. I shall emphasize
this point throughout, because it raises the possibility that in many do-
mains, people’s judgments about hedonic effects will be wrong.
In addition, it would seem to be humiliating for people to acknowl-
edge that for a certain amount, they would be willing to allow someone
to take two of their toes (see Korobkin 2003). Because they seek to avoid
the humiliation, their answer to the question might greatly overstate the
hedonic loss. Suppose that people were asked, “How much would you
have to be paid to accept some physical injury?” Their response, in-
cluding the humiliation involved in offering any answer at all, might be
far higher than their hedonic loss. An obvious problem is the signaling
effect of any afﬁrmative answer. Those who say that they are willing to
trade their toes for money might be offering a damaging signal about
their concern for their own integrity, bodily and otherwise. Hence peo-
ple’s unwillingness to accept a monetary amount in return for some loss
may not reﬂect the hedonic effect of the loss; the number may be inﬂated
because of the signaling effect of acceptance.
Perhaps the right question is instead, “How much would people,
having experienced the loss, need to be paid to feel adequately com-
pensated for that loss?” This question, one involving “making whole”
as distinct from “selling price,” seems to capture the judgments actually
made relevant by the legal system (see McCafferey, Kahneman, and
Spitzer 1995). It also has the advantage of focusing directly on people’s
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experience—a strong point in favor of WTA over WTP. But the “making
whole” question raises its own puzzles. How much money would be
necessary to make a person as well off as he would be if he had not
been injured at all? Suppose that someone has lost a spouse or a child,
or that he now faces chronic (and severe) headaches, or that his face
has been permanently disﬁgured. What amount of money would restore
the plaintiff to her preinjury state? Perhaps a certain answer makes sense
if it would enable the person to obtain medication to cure the headaches
or an operation to correct the disﬁgurement. But if these are not feasible,
what amount of money would restore the status quo? A standard answer
refers to the amount that would make the injured person indifferent as
between the injury and the injury with the compensation. But in cases
of chronic and severe pain, or permanent disﬁgurement, we could easily
imagine cases in which no amount would sufﬁce.
Or suppose that someone has lost two toes or been paralyzed from
the waist down. When asked how much would make them whole, it is
possible that people would sincerely say that they would have to be paid
(say) $100,000 for the loss of two toes, or $5,000,000to becompensated
for paralysis. But perhaps those very people do not suffer such a large
hedonic loss from the relevant conditions. Perhaps they are not greatly
suffering, or not suffering at all, but would nonetheless claim (sincerely)
that very high amounts are necessary to compensate them (see Smith et
al. 2006). I will explore this puzzle in some detail below, because it raises
serious doubts about the standard economic analysis in many domains
of law and policy.
Both WTP and WTA measures therefore face serious problems. Those
problems might be overcome if the legal system had direct access to
people’s welfare. Armed with an actual hedometer, legal institutions
might be able to make accurate measurements of the harmful effects of
various losses. Those involved in law mightbeableto know,forexample,
whether or not the loss of two toes, or a pet, or serious disﬁgurement
imposes a great deal of hedonic loss (see, for example, Washington v.
Aetna, 886 So. 2d 572 [La. 2004]). The results of an accurate hedonic
assessment would represent substantial progress, and a great deal of
effort has been devoted toward making such progress (see, for example,
Layard 2005; Kahneman et al. 2004; Ubel and Loewenstein 2008). Let
us now see how the resulting ﬁndings might bear on law.
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3. ADVERSE CONDITIONS AND HEDONICS
3.1. Resilience and Measurement
A major ﬁnding is that human beings are unexpectedly resilient. As a
result, many apparently signiﬁcant injuries donot inﬂictsubstantiallong-
term hedonic harms (Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz 1999; Gilbert
2006). Perhaps above all, it is important to distinguish between those
adverse conditions that impose large and persistent losses and those
adverse conditions that, because of human resilience, impose only tran-
sitional, short-term, or modest losses.
For purposes of law and policy, a key point here is that people are
often unable, in advance, to anticipate the hedonic effects of adverse
events, and their inability on this count produces hedonic forecasting
errors (see, for example, Gilbert et al. 1998). A central problem here is
adaptation neglect: people neglect the extent to which they will be able
to adapt to adverse changes and conditions. Adaptation is generally not
a product of self-conscious efforts to minimize the effects of such
changes; we are speaking of a general feature of human beings, not of
successful efforts to embrace some form of Stoicism (Nussbaum 1996).
Recall that, for the moment, my concern is genuinely hedonic losses. As
we shall see, it is possible that people will not suffer such losses, strictly
speaking, but will nonetheless suffer losses of an important kind.
It is reasonable to ask how hedonic effects are being measured. Most
of the relevant work involves questions about global happiness or life
satisfaction. People are asked, on a scale of (say) 0–8, about how happy
they are, or how satisﬁed they are, with their lives. Skeptics might ask,
“Do answers to such questions tell us anything at all?” This is a legit-
imate question, but people’s answers do turn out to be associated with
independent tests of hedonic state, including frequent smiling, smiling
with the eyes, quality of sleep, happiness ratings by friends, self-reported
health, frequent expressions of positive emotions, and being sociable
and outgoing (Kahneman and Kruger 2006). To date, no empirical work
falsiﬁes or even seriously undermines the suggestion that reports of
global happiness are in fact reﬂective of actual happiness, understood
as subjective mental states.
Skeptics might persist at this point, suggesting that what matters is
not global life satisfaction but some aggregation of life moments. And,
in fact, efforts have been made to assess people’s subjective well-being
in this way (see Kahneman et al. 2004). We should not be surprised to
ﬁnd that in some domains, answers to global questions will be different
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from aggregations of moments. Asked about how their life is going,
divorced or unmarried people might give relatively less positive answers,
focusing as they might on the fact that they are unmarried; but perhaps
unmarried people experience more, and not less, in the way of moment-
by-moment happiness. I will return to this possibility below.
It would also be sensible for skeptics to worry that whatever the
measure, people who suffer from adverse conditions might be engaging
in scale recalibration to reﬂect those conditions. Perhaps colostomy pa-
tients rank themselves high, on a bounded scale, on the ground that they
are relatively happy, considering their condition; but perhaps they would
rank themselves much lower if they were comparing themselves to
healthy people. If so, the surprisingly high rankings of those with adverse
conditions suggest not high levels of subjective well-being but a sense
that things are going well enough, all things considered. This conjecture
is apparently wrong. A number of efforts have been made to test for
scale recalibration, and thus far the verdict is clear: there is no evidence
of recalibration, and considerable evidence to the contrary (Ubel and
Loewenstein 2008). I shall be speaking here mainly of ﬁndings about
global life satisfaction, because these are the most numerous, but on
occasion I will refer to moment-by-moment measures as well.
3.2. Adaptation Neglect and Hedonic Forecasting Errors
Let us begin with the limited hedonic effects of many positive changes.
Lottery winners are not happier, a year later, than other people are (Frey
and Stutzer 2002, pp. 410–11). Marriage is often thought to be asso-
ciated with increases in happiness, but after a few years, married people
are not happier than they were before (compare Clark et al. [2003] with
Easterlin [2003]). Apparently marriage produces a signiﬁcant hedonic
boost, but the boost is short-lived, and people return fairly quickly to
their premarriage state. Increases in salary have a similar feature; a 20
percent increase is highly welcome, but after a short period, people do
not show a signiﬁcant long-term change in self-reported happiness or
life satisfaction.
With respect to many negative changes, including those that concern
the legal system, the hedonic effects are often surprisingly small. It is
remarkable but true that paraplegics are only modestly less happy than
other people (Kahneman and Krueger 2006).
1 Young people who have
1. An interesting question, not explored in the hedonic literature, is the extent to which
discrimination and stigma might contribute to the (admittedly modest) decrease in hap-
piness or perhaps in more signiﬁcant decreases in moment-by-moment happiness.
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lost a limb as a result of cancer show no less happiness than similarly
situated young people who have not had cancer (Ubel and Loewenstein
2008). Moderately disabled people recover to their predisability level
after 2 years (Oswald and Nattavudh 2005). Kidney dialysis patients do
not show lower levels of happiness than ordinary people (see Oswald
and Nattavudh 2005). Colostomy patients report levels of happiness
that are about the same as people who have not had colostomies (see
Smith et al. 2006). Intriguingly, those with colostomies greatly exag-
gerate their actual level of happiness before they had colostomies—while
those with reversed colostomies report that before the reversal,they were
far less happy than they were in fact (see Ubel and Loewenstein 2008).
I will return to these ﬁndings below.
From this evidence, it is fair to conclude that healthy people systemat-
ically overestimate the adverse effects of many physical problems. Those
who face such problems experience unexpectedly little in the way ofhedonic
loss (Ubel and Loewenstein 2008). As I have noted, it is possible to question
the relevant ﬁndings; social scientists do not yet have hedometers. But from
the existing work, the basic conclusions follow whether we rely on global
measures of happiness or life satisfaction or on moment-by-moment mea-
sures of mood and happiness, which might seem to be even more reliable
(see Ubel and Loewenstein 2008).
In a less dramatic vein, assistant professors greatly overstate the effect
of an adverse tenure decision on their subjective happiness (Gilbert and
Wilson 2000). They expect that this decision will affect their happiness
for many years and, in part for that reason, greatly want to be tenured.
But after a few years have passed, those who were denied tenure show
no less happiness than those who were tenured. Many voters believe
that the outcome of an election will greatly affect their happiness a
month after the election is held. But in that month, supporters of losing
and winning candidates are as happy as they were before the election
(Gilbert and Wilson 2000). People have been found to overestimate the
welfare effects of personal insults, the outcomes of sports events, and
romantic breakups; in all of these circumstances, the adverse effects,
while real and for a time severe, are surprisingly small and short-term
(Gilbert and Wilson 2000).
3.3. Enduring versus lllusory Losses (or Loud Unpleasant Noises
versus Fewer Toes)
To say this is not to deny that some advantageous events and conditions
create large and enduring gains and that some adverse events and con-
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ditions impose serious and persistent losses. Various drugs, such as Pro-
zac, apparently create long-term boosts in subjective well-being. It is
easy to imagine changes in the allocation of time—from, say, commuting
and work to socializing, vacations, and leisure—that would produce
enduring beneﬁts (see Frank 2000). Hence it is quite false to say that
people’s resilience and their capacity for adaptation ensure that social
changes and interventions are powerless to affect happiness or life sat-
isfaction. The task is to ensure that any changes counteract persistent
rather than illusory losses or that they produce gains to which people
will not quickly adapt.
On the negative side, consider the instructive and in a sense deﬁning
example of loud, unpleasant noise, which people much dislike andwhich
they do not dislike less as time passes (Frederick and Loewenstein 1999).
With respect to highway noise, people show approximately the same
level of irritation over a period of more than a year—and as time passes,
they become more pessimistic, not less so, about their ability to adjust
to the noise (Weinstein 1982). The physiological effects of noise do not
diminish in children over a signiﬁcant period of time (Frederick and
Loewenstein 1999). A study of college students ﬁnds greater levels of
annoyance at dormitory noise at the end of the year than at the beginning
(Frederick and Loewenstein 1999). Unpleasant noise reduces people’s
enjoyment of their lives, and it continues to reduce their enjoyment for
signiﬁcant periods of time. We should conclude that tortious behavior
that causes (for example) loud ringing in the ears will impose veryserious
and quite long-term hedonic losses.
Many adverse conditions belong in the same category as noise. Just
as people overestimate the hedonic harm of many physical losses, such
as kidney dialysis and colostomies, so too people underestimate the he-
donic effect of adverse effects, such as depression and chronic pain (see
Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson 2003). Leading sources of low levels of
happiness include mental illness (such as anxiety and depression) sub-
jectively reported bad health (above all, pain imposes severe and con-
tinuing hedonic losses), unemployment (Frederick and Loewenstein
1999), and separation from a spouse (Layard 2005, p. 64). The process
of divorce is bad, but not as bad as separation; notably, people adjust
fairly quickly and return to their predivorce state (Clark et al. 2003).
More speculatively, we might suggest that some medical conditions
produce signiﬁcant and enduring losses to the extent that people do not
stabilize but instead must anticipate medical results and consider, with
some frequency, whether they are getting better or worse. Certain can-
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cers, in which signiﬁcant periods of time are spent expecting and re-
ceiving results, might well fall in the same category as noise. Similarly,
the process of adaptation might be slowed, and focusing might be in-
creased, if people are worrying about whether an adverse condition can
be improved or reversed. Also speculatively, we might suggest that some
conditions impose signiﬁcant and enduring losses to the extent that they
produce discrimination and stigma of the kind to which people do not
easily adapt and on which they tend to focus. Serious facial disﬁgure-
ment, for example, might produce enduring hedonic losses because of
the social consequences of having a disﬁgured face.
It is therefore important to distinguish among four phenomena:
(1) gains that are signiﬁcant and enduring, such as those produced by
relief of chronic pain, (2) gains that are largely illusory, such as those
produced by increases in salary, (3) losses that are signiﬁcant and en-
during, such as those produced by pain, depression, and anxiety, and
(4) losses that turn out to be low or even illusory (at least in the long
term), such as those produced by loss of limbs or by colostomies. For
purposes of the legal questions on which I am focusing here, the latter
two phenomena are the most important.
3.4. Failures of Affective Forecasting
From these ﬁndings, we can draw two general conclusions. The ﬁrst is
that many apparently serious losses inﬂict relatively little in the way of
long-term hedonic harm. The second is that people do not anticipate
this fact; they expect far more harm than they actually experience. A
key reason is that people neglect the power of psychological mechanisms
that immunize them from the kinds of hedonic losses that they expect
to face in the event that things go wrong. It is important to try to
understand the sources of the resulting errors.
In many cases, people are subject to immune neglect; they do not see
the power of their internal psychological immune system, which greatly
diminishes the welfare effects of apparently signiﬁcant changes.Arelated
problem is that people demonstrate a kind of impact bias (see Gilbert
et al. 1998), in the form of a tendency to exaggerate the effect of future
events on their own emotional states. The exaggerations are sometimes
described as a consequence of duration bias (Gilbert et al. 1998), un-
derstood as a tendency to overestimate of the length of time duringwhich
undesirable effects will have an emotional impact.
The implication for the legal system is clear. If ordinary people make
mistakes in forecasting the effects of adverse events in their own lives,
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there is every reason to think that juries (and judges) will make similar
mistakes in assessing the effects of those events on plaintiffs, especially
but not only when they are projecting future losses. Hedonic judgment
errors are likely to affect those involved in the legal system as well as
ordinary people in ordinary life. As we shall see, the same point applies
to policymakers, including regulators.
3.5. Adaptation, Attention, and Focusing Illusions
Why, exactly, do adverse events often have relatively little effect on
people’s subjective well-being? The general phenomenon is adaptation.
The most obvious mechanism involves diminished sensitivity to a change
over time; what once seemed a large hedonic boost or a serious hedonic
loss often becomes part of life’s furniture. People do not anticipate this
fact—hence adaptation neglect. A second mechanism, which might be
deﬁned as a distinct phenomenon, involves attention. When apparent
losses inﬂict surprisingly little hedonic harm, it is often because people
do not much focus on those losses after a period of transition (see Kah-
neman et al. 2007). There is some evidence that adaptation is the dom-
inant explanation for people’s erroneous hedonic forecasts with respect
to health conditions. In particular, drawing people’s attention to the
possibility of adaptation reduces hedonic errors, whereas efforts to re-
duce focusing illusions had no such effect (Ubel,Loewenstein,andJepson
2005).
A great deal of work explores the possibility of adaptive preferences,
which arise as people adapt their preferences to the existing circum-
stances (see, for example, Elster 1983). Consider the tale of the fox and
the sour grapes. Knowing that they are unavailable, the fox does not
want the grapes; his preference is a product of their unavailability, to
which he has adapted (Elster 1983). The point might be counted as a
challenge to utilitarianism or to any account that emphasizes subjective
mental states: If people do not want opportunities or goods that are
unavailable, is it so clear that the unavailability of those opportunities
or goods can be defended by reference to people’s wants? Whether or
not this question can be answered, it is clear that when people’s pref-
erences have adapted to a social situation, their hedonic state will be
much better than outsiders will anticipate.
For an apparent real-world example, consider a study of self-reported
health in India, a year after the Great Bengal Famine of 1943 (see Nuss-
baum 1999, p. 139). Only 2.5 percent of widows said that they were
“ill,” and none said that they were in “indifferent” health. By contrast,
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45.6 of widowers said that they were either ill or in indifferent health.
The irony was that the widows were in signiﬁcantly worse health than
the widowers (Nussbaum 1999). Evidently the widows adapted to their
situation and generally believed that their health was good. In law, eco-
nomics, political science, and philosophy, analysis of adaptive prefer-
ences has proved especially illuminating (Elster 1983), but we continue
to lack an adequate understanding of the mechanisms of adaptation.
Several different factors seem to be at work.
The term “hedonic adaptation” refers to the adjustment over time in
the intensity of people’s emotional reactions to adverse events, in a way
that ensures unexpectedly limited losses in terms of subjective happiness
(see Frederick and Loewenstein 1999, p. 303). As I have noted, people’s
affective responses to a bad event or condition typically abate as time
passes (see Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson 2003). Those who have been
denied tenure, or lost the use of a limb, or have had a colonoscopy, will
react intensely at ﬁrst, but after a year, their affective response will be
much smaller. When moderately disabled people show little or no he-
donic loss, adaptation, thus understood, is the key reason.
A distinctive mechanism, which can also be taken as a separate ex-
planation for the general phenomenon of adaptation, involves the op-
eration of human attention (see Kahneman and Sugden 2005). When
people lose the use of an arm, they do not think, most of the time, about
the fact that one of their arms does not work. Instead they focus on the
central features of their hours and their days—their jobs, their meals,
their relationships, the book they are reading or the television show they
are watching. To the extent that signiﬁcant losses do notproducehedonic
damages, it is frequently because people’s attention is not directed, most
of the time, to those losses. Kahneman and Thaler (2006,p.229)describe
the problem in a wonderful maxim, my epigraph here: “Nothing in life
matters quite as much as you think it does while you are thinking about
it.”
A failure to focus on what has been lost helps to explain the absence
of substantial hedonic effects from apparently large losses. Focusing
illusions help in turn to account for people’s surprise at the absence of
such effects. People are surprised because they focus speciﬁcally on the
loss, indeed they are often asked speciﬁcally to do so, and thus conclude
that it has large hedonic effects, neglecting to see that those who have
experienced the loss do not, most of the time, focus on it. For hedonic
forecasting, the general point is that when asked to focus on a particular
aspect of life or a particular ingredient in welfare, observers are likely
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to make serious blunders, simply because in life, people do not usually
focus on any particular aspect or any particular ingredient. As we shall
soon see, many of the puzzles in the social science literature onsubjective
well-being are best explained in this light.
Consider a simple demonstration of a focusing illusion. Many people
appear to believe that they are less happy than they would be if they
lived in California (see Schkade and Kahneman 1998). This belief is held
by both people who live in California and people who do not live in
California. But in fact, those who live in California are not happier than
those who live elsewhere. Focusing on California weather in particular,
Californians and Ohioans believe that they would be happier in Cali-
fornia even though weather is not, in fact, an important determinant of
most people’s happiness. Failures in affective forecasting are often a
product of a focusing illusion: people focus on a particular loss without
seeing that after the loss has occurred, they are not likely to focus (much)
on that loss.
2 When primed to think about weather, or any other factor
that is a small ingredient in the subjective well-being of most people
(such as, for example, the ability to perform well in sports), focusing
illusions lead people to give excessive attention to that factor.
Contingent-valuation studies run into an exceedingly serious problem
for this reason (see Bateman and Willis 1999). In such studies, people
are speciﬁcally asked to value some good, event, or state of affairs (in-
cluding modest improvements in climate). If the focusing illusion is at
work, the resulting numbers will be unrealistically high. We could easily
imagine such a study with respect to the loss of two toes, an arm, or a
leg. If nothing in life matters quite as much as people think it does when
they are thinking about it, then contingent-valuation studies are likely
to inﬂate the importance of certain goods, because they are explicitly
designed to make people think about (the relevant) “it.” It should be
easy to see that a similar problem might infect judges and juries, which
are, by hypothesis, being focused on a particular loss.
These points, and an understanding of attention in particular, help
to explain why some conditions do in fact produce serious or enduring
losses. Noise is the exemplar here; loud and unpleasant noises create
such losses because it is hard not to focus on them. In the same vein,
conditions that impose enduring losses command attention; people nec-
essarily focus on them. It is hard, for example, not to attend to chronic
2. Note, however, the failure to replicate the ﬁnding of a focusing illusion in Ubel,
Loewenstein, and Jepson (2005).
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pain. By deﬁnition, depression and anxiety cannot be put to one side.
To the extent that social situations draw constant attention to a con-
dition, people will attend to that condition. When people are separated
from their spouses, they are focused, much of the time, on that fact. A
few years afterward, divorce becomes a background fact, not a source
of constant attention. Parents whose children are suffering or needing
constant attention will experience serious hedonic losses; it is hard not
to attend to the needs or distress of one’s children, and such distress
can serve, for parents, as exceedingly loud noise (with remarkable am-
pliﬁers).
Other puzzles in the hedonic literature can be similarly understood.
Marriage produces a short-term burst in life satisfaction, because those
who are recently married are thinking, much of the time, about their
recent marriage. But after a few years, marriage becomes part of life’s
furniture, and it ceases to create the hedonic boost—even if the union
is entirely happy.
We are now in a position to understand one of the most counterin-
tuitive ﬁndings in the hedonic literature. The life satisfaction of many
disabled people is not greatly lower than that of able-bodied people, and
for some kinds of disabilities, life satisfaction is essentially the same. At
the same time, many disabled people believe that they were happier
before they were disabled, and there is clear evidence that they would
pay a great deal to return to their predisability state (see Samaha 2007).
If the analysis here is correct, disabled people are themselves subject, or
made subject, to a focusing illusion when they are asked how their lives
were (would be) different when they were (if they were) not disabled,
or how much they would pay not to be disabled in terms of money or
remaining years of life.
3 I am not sure that this claim is correct; we do
not have sufﬁcient evidence to know for sure. But if the claim seems
preposterous, consider the following question: “Would you be happier
if the weather in your city—say, Chicago, Boston, New York, or Phil-
adelphia—were automatically converted to the weather of Los Angeles
or San Francisco?” You might well say yes. But you would be wrong.
3. It is possible, however, that disabled people are showing an implicit appreciation
of the importance of capabilities, an issue that I take up below.
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4. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
4.1. Juries, Adaptation, and Attention
For the legal system, there is a concrete implication. Juries and others
are likely to make hedonic judgment errors, often exaggerating the he-
donic effects of losses.
4 The ﬁrst problem is that juries and judges will
almost certainly suffer from adaptation neglect. The second problem is
that when asked to award damages for a certain loss, the attention of
the jury (and the judge) is speciﬁcally ﬁxed on the loss in question. It is
as if juries were asked, “Would you be happier in California?” Delib-
erately focused on a particular injury, juries are unlikely to see that most
of the time, the plaintiff may not be much focused on the particular
injury. The very circumstances of trial invite adaptation neglect and
create the focusing illusion.
5 In the legal system, juries and judges are
asked speciﬁcally to think about the importance of the things that they
are intensely thinking about.
Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff has lost two ﬁngers or an arm,
and the jury is asked to monetize the loss, including the pain and suf-
fering associated with it. Because of the power of the psychological
immune system, it is not implausible to think that the loss is short-term
and very small. After a period of adjustment and (admittedly nontrivial)
transition costs, those who lose two ﬁngers, or even an arm, may be
only modestly worse off, in hedonic terms, than those who have suffered
no such loss. In fact they might not be worse off at all; recall that there
is no discernible hedonic difference between ordinary people and those
who have lost a limb as a result of cancer (see Ubel and Loewenstein
2008).
Juries and judges are unlikely to understand this point. In all prob-
ability, they too will show adaptation neglect and suffer from a focusing
illusion, akin to those asked whether they would be happier if they lived
in California. It is sensible to think that in the award of damages, the
legal system is likely to be showing a systematic bias as a result. And,
in fact, it is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd cases in which such a bias is exhibited,
4. An illuminating discussion, overlapping with the treatment here and focused on
hedonic damages in particular, is Bagenstos and Schlanger (2007).
5. Admittedly, this is true for plaintiffs as well as for juries. Those who bring suit will
likely focus on their injury—likely more so than those who do not bring suit. On purely
hedonic grounds, it might well make sense to discourage (some) plaintiffs from bringing
suit, because litigation will prevent hedonic adaptation. To the extent that the suit focuses
the plaintiff on the relevant condition, the problem I am describing—exaggerated damage
awards—is reduced.
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with substantial damage awards for adverse events that are unlikely to
have inﬂicted serious hedonic losses (see, for example, Dauria v. City of
New York, 577 N.Y.S. 2d 64 [App. Div. 1991]; Coleman v. Deno,8 3 2
So. 2d 1016 [La. Ct. App. 2002]; Squibb v. Century Group, 824 So. 2d
861 [La. Ct. App. 2002]; Thornton v. Amtrak, 802 So. 2d 816 [La. Ct.
App. 2001]; Keefe v. E & D Specialty Stands, Inc., 708 N.Y.S. 214 [N.Y.
App. Div. 2000]). Consider, for example, a $1 million award for the loss
of feeling and strength in a hand (see Keefe v. E & D Specialty Stands,
Inc., 708 N.Y.S. 2d 214) or an award of $1.5 million for the amputation
o faﬁ n g e r( Thornton v. Amtrak, 802 So. 2d 816).
We might reach a similar conclusion for hedonic damages. If someone
has lost a dog, he is likely to suffer, and the legal system should award
compensation. But the suffering will not usually last a long time.
6 Or
suppose that someone has lost mobility, so that she can no longer ski
or play tennis. If the question is how much that person has lost in terms
of enjoyment of life, understood in hedonic terms, the answer is, very
plausibly, little or nothing.
It is both true and important that even if long-term harms are not
likely, the short-term harms might be severe. People might experience a
degree of distress, fear, mourning, and grief for which a signiﬁcant degree
of compensation is justiﬁed. Large monetary awards might well be given
for short periods of intense suffering or sense of loss. The only point is
that juries are likely to exaggerate the long-term effects and to that extent
to award excessive damage awards. If short-term harms are severe, they
should be recognized and compensated as such.
The existence of hedonic forecasting errors also suggests the possi-
bility that juries are awarding insufﬁciently large sums in cases in which
the hedonic loss is likely to be high. Recall that for some losses, people
underestimate that loss. Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff issuffering
chronic back pain. The pain may be relatively low level, but it might
be persistent. It is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd cases in which juries award low
damage awards in such instances (see, for example, Levy v. Bayou Indus.
Maint. Serv., 855 So. 2d 968, 980 [La.Ct.App.2003],awarding$50,000
for postconcussion syndrome, including vertigo and migraine head-
aches). Consider, for example, a $4,000 award for an accident producing
headaches three to four times per week and persistent pain in the hands,
knees, and shoulders (Hatcher v. Ramada Plaza Hotel & Conf. Ctr.,
6. I put to one side the question whether the dog’s loss should be treated as a loss for
the dog, not for human beings; I would answer that question afﬁrmatively.
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2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 255 [Conn. Super. Ct. 2003]), a $25,000
award to 19-year-old woman whose accident causes a painful hip de-
formity, headaches, ringing in the ears, permanent arthritis in the hip,
and backaches (Frankel v. Todd, 260 F. Supp. 772 [E.D. Pa. 1966]), an
award of $47,000 for an accident causing herniation in the lower back,
accompanied by permanent radiating pain and restriction (Ledesma v.
Long Island R.R., 1997 WL 33346870 [E.D.N.Y. 1997]), or an award
of $30,000 for permanent pain in the neck and knee from a herniated
cervical disc and torn meniscus (Russo v. Jordan, 2001 N.Y. Slip Op.
20062U, 9 [N.Y. Misc. 2001]). In all these cases, the award seems far
too low, because the relevant injury is likely to be enduring.
In the abstract, low-level back pain, headaches, ringing in the ears,
and pain in the neck and knee may not seem especially serious; these
are familiar phenomena, unlike loss of a limb. It is easy to imagine a
jury judgment that while headaches are unpleasant, they are part of
daily life, and that the loss of a limb is devastating. But to the extent
that headaches, ringing in the ears, and similar conditions are severe,
they are likely to operate in the same way as noise: as problems that do
not improve much over time. People might well undervalue such injuries
with the thought that such conditions are ordinary parts of human ex-
perience—unlike, say, the loss of toes. But those who face chronic pain,
severe headaches, or loud ringing in the ears suffer massive hedonic
losses, and jurors are unlikely to appreciate that fact.
It is possible of course that some juries and judges might distrust
claims of back pain and to be discounting the award because of the risk
of faking. But even if those involved in the legal system do believe the
claims, they will probably underestimate the adverse effects of certain
losses over time. Imagine, for example, what it means to be subject to
loud ringing in the ears or to persistent headaches. The same points
apply to cases in which tortious behavior produces depressionoranxiety.
In such cases, the hedonic injury is very serious, and signiﬁcant damage
awards are justiﬁed (see, for example, Hall v. Brookshire Bros., Ltd.,
831 So. 2d 1010 [La. Ct. App. 2002]; Levy v. Bayou Indus. Maint.
Servs., 855 So. 2d at 980). Juries and judges might well fail to see this
point.
4.2. Capability Damages
If the discussion thus far is correct, awards for pain and suffering, and
for hedonic damages, are often inﬂated from the hedonic point of view.
But does this mean that they are inﬂated from the correct point of view?
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The very ideas of “pain and suffering” and “hedonic damages” suggest
attention to subjective mental states; the law’s ofﬁcial theory speaks in
explicitly hedonic terms. But it is reasonable to think that subjective
mental states are not all that matter and that the legal system is attentive
to that fact. If an injury causes a signiﬁcant diminution of cognitive
functions, without adversely affecting moods, something has been lost.
Let us now shift gears, moving from a purely Benthamite perspective,
focused only on subjective mental states, to an Aristotelian one, focused
on what people are able to do and to be.
Loss of Capabilities. Suppose that Jones loses the use of a leg; suppose
too that the loss does not affect Jones’s self-reported happiness. After a
difﬁcult but short period of adjustment, Jones is as happy as he was
before the loss. Suppose too that the effort to measure Jones’s moment-
by-moment happiness ﬁnds that he is no less happy than he was before
(see Kahneman et al. 2004). In other words, Jones has experienced no
hedonic loss. Should the legal system therefore disregard Jones’s injury?
What Jones has lost is a capability (compare Sen 1985; Nussbaum
2001; Sen 1999).
7 He cannot walk on his leg; he certainly is unable to
run. He is unable to engage in many activities that he used to be able
to take for granted. Jones may not be in pain and he may not besuffering.
Jones may not be suffering hedonic damage in the sense that no hedom-
eter can show that Jones enjoys his life less than he did before. Might
the legal system nonetheless award damages? If the answer is yes, it is
not justiﬁed by a hedonic loss. Instead the loss involves a capability.
That loss may be real and signiﬁcant, even if hedonic measuresareunable
to capture it. Consider, as apparently supporting evidence, the fact that
most people would be willing to pay signiﬁcant amounts to avoid a loss
of a capability, even if they could be persuaded that the loss would inﬂict
no hedonic harm.
8
7. I am not using the idea of capabilities in the same sense as Sen and Nussbaum, but
my use belongs in the same general family, focusing as it does on the capacity to function
rather than subjective mental states.
8. It is important to see, of course, that whether someone has lost a capability depends
on how social institutions react to the relevant losses. If someone has lost the use of a
foot, perhaps he is able to use a prosthetic foot, and perhaps the prosthetic footcanfunction
quite well. The same might be true for legs. And even if people are using wheelchairs, the
capability loss produced by wheelchair use is a product of how social institutions accom-
modate people in wheelchairs. One way to understand the Americans with Disabilities Act
is to see it as an effort to reduce the risk that impairments will turn into capability losses.
Nonetheless, it remains true that many injuries produce signiﬁcant and long-term losses
of that kind even if no long-term hedonic harm is experienced.
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The claim on behalf of capability losses is a normative one, based
on the objective harm faced by those who lose physical or cognitive
abilities. If people have had colostomies or if they are on dialysis ma-
chines, they have suffered a signiﬁcant loss whatever their hedonic state.
Consider here two remarkable ﬁndings. As we have seen, people with
colostomies do not show less happiness than people withoutcolostomies;
but at the same time, they say that they would give up to 15 percent of
their lives to be able to live without a colostomy (see Loewenstein and
Ubel 2006). Similarly, dialysis patients show little adverse hedonic effect,
but many of them say that they would willingly yield over half their
remaining years in order to have normal kidney function (see Loew-
enstein and Ubel 2006)! It is possible that these answers indicate a he-
donic loss that is not adequately captured by efforts to measure subjec-
tive well-being. But they also seem to suggest a concern for capabilities,
not merely for hedonic states.
Hedonic Judgment Errors or Recognition of Capabilities? In invoking this
evidence, I do not mean to suggest that people’s statements on such
points should be taken as authoritative.
9 Begin with the case of healthy
people. If such people are horriﬁed at the prospect of having a colostomy,
and if they cannot bear the thought of being on a dialysis machine, they
might well believe, quite falsely, that the relevant change would make
life barely livable; so the evidence suggests (see, for example, Ubel et al.
2001). Hedonic judgment errors of this kind might well be impervious
to debiasing (for evidence that some debiasing strategies help and that
others do not, see Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson 2005). It is imaginable,
for example, that people would be willing to demand a great deal to
lose a leg, even if they could be given a fully adequate prosthetic (perhaps
better than the original) and even if they could be given reliable evidence
that they would suffer no hedonic loss after a (brief) period of transition.
People’s conclusions about what they would pay to avoid or to eliminate
a loss might well reﬂect a hedonic judgment error or a heuristic that is
productive of blunders, and if so, those conclusions should not be taken
as a basis for policy. If a hedonic judgment error is at work, people are
not, in fact, showing an appreciation of capability losses.
The judgments of those who have actually suffered such losses would
seem to be entitled to more weight. Because colostomy or dialysis pa-
tients would give up signiﬁcant amounts of their lives to be well, we do
9. This seems to me the tendency in Loewenstein and Ubel (2006).
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appear to have reason to think that they are (recognizing that they are)
suffering a real loss whatever their hedonic states. Compare a person
who has lost cognitive capacities; such a person may believe that he has
suffered a real loss even if his hedonic state is good. But it is possible
that colostomy or dialysis patients too are vulnerable to focusing illu-
sions, no less than those in Chicago or Cleveland who might be willing
to give up a great deal to have the weather enjoyed by people in Los
Angeles. Recall that colostomy patients report wildly and inaccurately
high levels of happiness before they had colostomies and that people
whose colostomies have been reversed say that they were far less happy
than they were in fact (see Smith et al. 2006).
In short, I am not claiming that when people say that they want to
avoid conditions that do not impose hedonic losses, they are actually
motivated by a recognition of capability losses; a hedonic judgment error
may well be responsible.
10 My only claim is that when people have lost
a capability, they have lost something signiﬁcant from the normative
point of view, even if they have suffered no hedonic loss.
Law and Well-Being. For those who believe that the legal system should
accept this view, two difﬁcult questions remain. First, what kinds of
capability losses are legally cognizable? Second, how can capabilities be
translated into monetary equivalents? At ﬁrst glance, a notion of normal
human functioning would seem to provide the baseline from which to
measure capability loss (for discussion, see Satz 2006). It would follow
that if someone has lost the use of a leg or an arm, or of cognitive or
sexual abilities, a capability loss is involved. I will return below to the
question of monetization.
Recognition of the importance of capabilities has broader importance
for thinking about well-being, whether it is measured in terms of self-
reports involving global life satisfaction (see Frank 2000) or in terms of
moment-by-moment measures, designed to capture daily experience (see
Kahneman et al. 2004). Those who are able to run, or to have sexual
experiences, are better off than those who lack these capabilities, even
if the difference cannot be picked up in hedonic terms. Those who are
poorly educated have less in the way of capability than those who are
well educated, even if hedonic measures cannot identify a difference
between the two groups. It is possible that people with less education
do not show more negative affect or less positive affect, during their
10. Compare Loewenstein and Ubel (2006), which appears to honor people’s judg-
ments even though they might well be based on cognitive errors.
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days, than people with a great deal of education (compare Kahneman
et al. 2004), but education as such contributes to a richer life. Even if
well-educated people do not seem happier according to a hedometer,
their enjoyments are more numerous and qualitatively distinct; for good
Millian reasons, taken up below, education is valuable whatever its ef-
fects on utility, narrowly conceived.
An emphasis on subjective measures is important, because subjective
experience matters a great deal. But purely hedonic accounts, focused
solely on people’s moods, miss aspects of well-being to which sensible
societies and legal systems are attuned. It is easy to imagine a group of
people who score well on some hedonic measure—perhaps they are all
generally at 6, on a scale of 0–8, in terms of positive affect during their
days—whose lives are not very good, even in terms of their own con-
sidered judgments. As we will see, capabilities are not the only supple-
ment to hedonic measures, but for purposes of what concerns the legal
system, they are the most important such supplement.
In a variety of cases, supposedly hedonic damages are probably best
justiﬁed as capability damages. For example, courts have awarded he-
donic damages for loss of the ability to engage in sports (see Day v.
Ouachita Parish School Bd., 823 So. 2d at 1044; Allen v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 241 F. 3d at 1297). Hedonic damages have been awarded
for the loss of the senses of taste and smell (see Daugherty v. Erie R.R.
Co., 169 A. 2d 549 [Pa. Sup. Ct. 1961]). Courts have also awarded
signiﬁcant hedonic damages for the loss of a limb, in a way that may
reﬂect, or be defensible in terms of, a capability loss ratherthanahedonic
forecasting error (see Pierce v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 409 F.2d 1392;
Matos v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co., 808 So. 2d 841). Hedonic damages
have been awarded where the tort victim could no longer engage in
sexual activities as a result of the injury (see Varnell v. Louisiana Tech
University, 709 So. 2d at 896). Or consider a case in which the injury
rendered the plaintiff mentally retarded; the court awardedhedonicdam-
ages for the plaintiff’s loss of ability to, among other things, go on a
ﬁrst date, parent children, read, and debate the politics of the day (see
Nemmers v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 567). It is possible that the court
believed that the plaintiff was less happy in some subjective sense. If so,
the court might well have been wrong. But the plaintiff lost a capability,
indeed a set of capabilities, and might be taken to have deserved damages
for that reason.
Consider the possibility that many people who have suffered signif-
icant neurological damage are not less happy than they were before;
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there is no reason to believe that people with Down’s Syndrome are
unhappy, and they may in fact be unusually happy. Does it follow that
damage awards should be low, or zero, for tortious behavior that has
produced certain neurological damage or Down’s Syndrome in infants?
If loss of capabilities matters, signiﬁcant damage awards would be jus-
tiﬁed even without an effect on subjective well-being.
Normative Issues. The idea of capability damages will be puzzling to
those with strongly Benthamite inclinations, who think that such well-
being is all that matters. And it is true that the term “hedonic damages”
has an unmistakably Benthamite ring; if it is using a nonhedonic mea-
sure, the legal system is relying on a theory of harm that is not captured
by the law’s own rubric. My principal suggestion is that many cases that
award such damages are best justiﬁed on the ground that they reﬂect
an implicit commitment to the importance of capabilities (compare the
overlapping conclusions in Bagenstos and Schlanger [forthcoming]).Peo-
ple receive monetary compensation not because they enjoy their lives
less but because they have lost a capability. A key question, which a
reading of the cases cannot answer, is whether the decisions are animated
by some kind of hedonic judgment error or instead an intuitive but
sensible judgment about capabilities.
The normative issues are complex, and I can offer only a few brief
remarks here. Suppose that Jones has been severely injured and suffers
a serious loss in cognitive capacities. Suppose too that the pain and
suffering have been modest and that there is little or no loss in subjective
well-being. Should Jones receive capability damages? Under the ofﬁcial
theory of hedonic damages, the question is whether Jones has suffered
a diminution in his enjoyment of life. If that idea is understood in purely
hedonic terms, there is a real doubt whetherdamagesshouldbeavailable;
perhaps the relevant hedometers are unable to pick up any loss. But it
is plausible to think that Jones has lost some enjoyment of life whatever
the (relevant) hedometers say. Jones is now unable to have certain kinds
of enjoyments that are available only to those who operate at particular
cognitive level. The loss of (the capacity for) those enjoyments ought to
matter.
For some of the cases, John Stuart Mill’s distinction between higher
and lower pleasures is clearly relevant (see Mill 1863). Thus Mill writes,
“[I]t is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted
with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a
most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their
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higher faculties....[ N o ] i n telligent human being would consent to be
a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling
and conscience would be selﬁsh and base, even though they should be
persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisﬁed with
his lot than they are with theirs” (Mill 1863, chap. 2). When hedonic
damages are awarded for the loss of cognitive capacities, judges and
juries might well be responding to a logic of this kind. Whether or not
they are responding to that logic, signiﬁcant damage awards are justiﬁed
for such losses.
If it is correct to emphasize the importance of capabilities, the general
argument applies to a wide range of losses, including those that do not
involve higher-level cognitive functions. If Jones is unable to engage in
sexual relationships or to participate in certain athletic activities, it is
plausible to say that his enjoyment of life has been impaired, once the
right content has been given to that concept. It is true, however, that
use of the idea of capability makes less sense for those losses that are
essentially hedonic. If a person was once able to play tennis, but no
longer can, is there a genuine loss if no hedometer can identify it? The
answer to that question may be “no” even if we are conﬁdent that those
with serious cognitive impairments, however happy, have lost some of
the enjoyment of life. Perhaps the answer is “yes,” because the person
has lost an option, and because the option has value. I will return to
this issue shortly.
Of course it is true that the category of capability loss doesnotrequire
plaintiffs to be compensated for any inability to engage in some task. If
someone is no longer able to do calligraphy, or to reach the top shelf
on her tiptoes, or to hit certain high notes when singing in the shower,
compensation may not be justiﬁed. (The analysis might be different if
the plaintiff is calligrapher or an opera singer.) The task is to identify
those losses that are sufﬁciently basic or foundational to justify a mon-
etary award. Development of a full theory would be a large task, but
at a glance at the cases suggest that whatever the content of the theory,
losses of a leg, of sexual capacities, of mobility, and of cognitive function
are strong candidates for inclusion. Compare in this regard the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act, which labels people “disabled” if they have
an impairment that signiﬁcantly limits “major life activities”; the inquiry
into “major life activities” might similarly be understood in terms of
capability losses.
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4.3. Translating (Hedonic and Capability) Losses into Money
Suppose that Jones has suffered a loss of a leg and that the loss produces
a stated hedonic injury. We might agree that the loss is less serious than
the loss of both legs but more serious than the loss of three toes. What
is the monetary value of the loss? Perhaps the same method can be used
to answer that question regardless of whether we are investigating he-
donic losses or capability losses.
Willingness to Pay? If we were speaking in economic terms, we might
ask how much Jones would be willing to pay to eliminate a
1/100,000 risk of losing the loss of a leg. As we have seen, this is a
standard approach in the valuation of mortality and morbidity risks.
Suppose that the focus is on Jones’s hedonic loss. If so, the discussion
thus far should be enough to show that Jones’s willingness to pay may
reﬂect a hedonic forecasting error. Perhaps Jones would be willing to
pay $50 to avoid that risk, which implies a loss of $5 million, even
though the hedonic loss from a lost leg would not be terribly serious.
Recall that loss aversion itself appears to be a hedonic forecasting error
(see Kermer et al. 2006).
Alternatively, suppose that the focus is on Jones’s capability loss.
Perhaps Jones is concerned that the loss of a leg is a loss of a capability.
He might want to pay a certain amount to preserve the option value of
having his leg, or he might want to pay that amount of preserve the
capability as such. In principle, his willingness to pay might be a good
measure of the relevant value. But it is hard to imagine that faced with
small probabilities of such losses, peoplecangenerateﬁguresthatreliably
capture the capability values of signiﬁcant harms, especially in view of
the difﬁculty of measuring the actual effects of such losses before they
have occurred.
If the goal of compensation is to restore people to the status quo,
then people’s willingness to pay, before the fact, is an unreliable measure.
The gold standard consists of people’s actual experience, and as we have
seen, willingness to pay is likely to reﬂect a hedonic judgment error. In
fact, it may be a mistake to rely on people’s judgment about necessary
compensation even after they are injured. Of course their judgment is
least reliable in the period immediately following the injury. At that
point, their focus on the injury and its removal may reﬂect a focusing
illusion, no less than when people are asked about the weather. And
long after the injury has occurred, a focusing illusion might also distort
their judgments, whether we are speaking in hedonic terms or in terms
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of capabilities. Recall that colostomy and dialysis patients would pay a
great deal (in terms of remaining years of life!) to be well, even though
available measures suggest that they are no less happy than they were
before.
An argument in favor of willingness to pay might take the following
form. The legal system attempts to produce the right deterrent signals.
Suppose that people believe, before the fact, that the loss of a limb is
terrible and would be willing to pay a great deal to reduce the risk of
that loss. Suppose that the legal system awards them a relatively low
amount, capturing the actual (as opposed to the wrongly anticipated)
loss. Knowing about the prospect of a low award and anticipating the
risk of loss, other people, facing that risk, will take extensive precautions
against that risk. If so, the willingness-to-pay ﬁgure might be used even
if it is based on an error, because use of that ﬁgure is necessary to avoid
those precautions. The argument cannot be ruled out of bounds, but it
probably relies on heroic assumptions about the sensitivity of ordinary
people to likely awards from the legal system. Accurate awards—some-
times lower and sometimes higher than what people would be willing
to pay to avoid—will have behavioral effects at the margin, but it is
doubtful that those effects would be large.
Scaling without a Modulus. Loosened from willingness to pay, however,
jurors are likely to produce highly unpredictable results. Indeed, the
problem of translating hedonic or capability harms into monetary equiv-
alents is a large source of inequality and variability in the legal system.
Studies of pain-and-suffering awards show a great deal of noise, in the
form of variations unexplained by differences in the cases (see Leebron
1989). The same is true of awards for sexual harassment (Sharkey2006).
Experimental work suggests that some of the unpredictability comes
from the fact that when translating injuries into dollars, jurors are being
asked to scale without a modulus—that is, to assign monetary values
along an unbounded numerical scale without being given a modulus, or
standard, by which to establish a meaning for the various points on the
scale (see Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade 1998; Kahneman, Schkade,
and Sunstein 1998).
Imagine, for example, that people are asked to offer a numerical
equivalent for the brightness of a light, or the loudness of a noise, on
a bounded scale of 0 to inﬁnity. There is every reason to believe that
their judgments would have a high degree of unpredictability—not be-
cause of disagreement on anything substantial, but because of the nature
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of the scale. This problem certainly infects awards for pain and suffering:
what is the monetary equivalent of 3 months with migraine headaches,
or 6 months of rehabilitation of a broken leg, or back pain for the next
20 years? The same is true for hedonic damages, for jurors are not given
a modulus by which to decide on the economic value of some loss of
the enjoyment of life. What is the monetary equivalent of the loss of a
dog, a limb, cognitive functioning, or sexual capacities? Now suppose
that we are not speaking in hedonic terms at all, and the question is the
monetary value of a loss of a capability. What is the dollar value of such
a loss?
The translation of hedonic or capability losses into monetary equiv-
alents raises daunting problems. But at the very least, it would be val-
uable to be able to know what is lost in welfare terms, beforeanyattempt
is made at translation. My minimal suggestion here has been that judges
and juries are likely to make serious blunders in answering the welfare
question.
4.4. Toward Civil Damages Guidelines
We can now identify two serious problems in the current situation. First
(and this is the more established problem), juries and judges are likely
to have difﬁculty in generating monetary ﬁgures to reﬂect pain, suffering,
and loss of enjoyment of life. Because it is difﬁcult to scale without a
modulus, and because anchors will have a signiﬁcant effect, unjustiﬁed
inequality and excessive and insufﬁcient awards are inevitable. Second
(and this is the problem uncovered by the happiness literature), juries
and judges are likely to make hedonic judgment errors. My emphasis
has been on the second problem, but if we take the two together, we
will be inclined to consider large-scale reforms. Proceeding from scratch,
no sensible person could possibly want to produce damage awards by
asking ordinary people, with little guidance, to assign monetary amounts
to losses with which they are unlikely to have had much experience.
The most obvious response would be a set of civil damages guidelines,
charged with the task of rationalizing the current situation. The guide-
lines would place heavy reliance on existing knowledge about hedonic
harms, so as to avoid the risk of high awards for illusory losses and low
awards for such harms as chronic pain, migraines, anxiety, and depres-
sion. To the extent that the short-term hedonic losses are present even
when long-term adaptation occurs, the guidelines would take that point
into account. To the extent that discrimination and stigma play a role
in producing hedonic or other harm, the guidelines would consider that
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point as well (see Bagenstos and Schlanger forthcoming). A signiﬁcant
part of the harm of certain injuries consists of the resulting social stigma,
on which it might be difﬁcult not to focus and from which botheconomic
and noneconomic injuries may follow. Those injuries deserve to count
(Bagenstos and Schlanger forthcoming). Moreover, a large advantage of
the guidelines is that they would make it less necessary, and perhaps
even unnecessary, for disabled plantiffs to “perform” their disability or
their suffering in court, in a way that could be embarrassing and even
humiliating.
The guidelines would also attempt to make sensible translations into
monetary equivalents, perhaps by drawing workers’ compensation
awards, which reﬂect a similar attempt at rationalization. Willingness-
to-pay ﬁgures would provide at least a start here; perhaps the best ap-
proach would begin with WTP for hedonic and capability losses and
make suitable adjustments when WTP depends on a demonstrable error.
Finally, the guidelines would make judgments about capability damages,
clearly distinguishing them from hedonic harms.
The development of such guidelines would have a signiﬁcant tech-
nocratic dimension. The goal would not be to build on ordinary intui-
tions, which are unreliable. It would instead be to incorporate what has
been learned about the actual effects of various losses. To the extent
that the legal system is concerned with the consequences for subjective
well-being, the distinction between persistent and illusory losses would
play a key role. In addition, a great deal of attention would have to be
paid to ranking capability losses and turning them into monetary equiv-
alents. That task would have a technocratic feature, but it would be
inescapably normative. Which capabilities are foundational? How does
the loss of an arm compare with the loss of sexual function? For ca-
pability losses, reﬂective judgments, made perhaps by representative and
diverse panels, would be most valuable.
If civil damages guidelines were in place, the role of judges and juries
would be limited and analogous to that of judges under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. Attention would continue to be paid to particular
circumstances: the loss of a hand is worse for a concert pianist than for
a professor of comparative literature. In the criminal context, of course,
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been subject to vigorous objec-
tions; they seem to reﬂect errors and biases of various sorts, and rule-
based systems may not, in the abstract, be better than standard-based
alternatives. We cannot entirely exclude the possibility that civildamages
guidelines would be even worse than the status quo. But the current
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system of awards deserves some kind of award for combining unjustiﬁed
inequality with cognitive errors. There is every reason to try to do better.
4.5. Broader Lessons
These remarks bear on much larger questions. In this section, I offer
some notes on the relationship between happiness on the one hand and
willingness to pay and income growth on the other.
Willingness to Pay and Happiness. As I have suggested, many economists
and economically oriented lawyers work with the WTP criterion. If peo-
ple are willing to pay $50 to eliminate a 1/100,000 risk of losing a foot,
there is a good argument that government should start with that number
in deciding on appropriate policies. Suppose, however, that people’s
WTP is a product of a systematic bias, perhaps in the form of a focusing
illusion. If so, the connection between WTP and welfare effects will be
weakened and possibly very weak (Sunstein 2007). People may be pur-
chasing goods from which they receive little hedonic beneﬁt, and they
may be failing to purchase goods from which they receive signiﬁcant
hedonic beneﬁts. (To be sure, people are willing to pay for nonhedonic
reasons, as for example when they give to those in need; but often, at
least, the motivation is hedonic.) And if this is so, there are serious
problems with reliance on WTP, because it operates as a crude proxy
for welfare effects, understood in hedonic terms. In short, hedonic fore-
casting errors raise serious problems for standard ways of conducting
cost-beneﬁt analysis.
We can see the point most clearly in connection with contingent-
valuation studies. Suppose that people are asked, “How much would
you be willing to pay to ensure that climate in your city does not increase
by a certain amount by a certain date or to avoid a 1/100,000 chance
of losing a ﬁnger?” The problem is that such questions speciﬁcally focus
people on a certain loss and for that reason create a grave risk of a
focusing illusion (see Kahneman and Sugden 2005). To the extent that
contingent-valuation studies elicit WTP, there is a serious problem.
Perhaps markets will reduce the problem, because the budget con-
straint, and the full menu of possible expenditures, looms much larger
in the market domain than in the circumstances of surveys. Perhaps in
their daily lives, people will not suffer serious focusing illusions when
deciding how much to pay to reduce risks, because they are alert, at the
relevant times, to the opportunity costs of the expenditures.Whenpeople
have experience and obtain prompt feedback, they are far less likely to
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err (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Nonetheless, sellers of products would
very much like to generate focusing illusions in order to ensure that
people will buy their products. And it is entirely possible that even in
the market domain, WTP reﬂects a systematic distortion with respect to
losses that seem to be signiﬁcant (but are not) and with respect to losses
that seem to be relatively trivial (but are large). A great deal of work
remains to be done on this problem, which seems to unsettle many of
the standard claims and views in economic analysis of policy and law
(for preliminary thoughts, see Sunstein 2007).
Income Growth, Happiness, and Capability. One of the most striking ﬁnd-
ings in modern social science is that increases in economic growth are
not correlated with increases in measures of happiness or reported life
satisfaction (see, for example, Layard 2005; Kahneman and Krueger
2006). The United States, France, and Japan all experienced dramatic
increases in real income in the twentieth century but showed no increase
in subjective well-being (Diener and Suh 2002). An especially striking
ﬁnding involves China (see Kahneman and Krueger 2006).Between1994
and 2005, China experienced explosive growth in average real income—
250 percent in fact. In that same period, life satisfaction has actually
declined, with a reduction in reported satisfaction from 80 percent to
70 percent and an increase in reported dissatisfaction from 21 percent
to 35 percent (Kahneman and Krueger 2006).
For purposes of self-reported happiness according to global measures,
what appears to matter is relative economic position, not absolute eco-
nomic position (see Frank 2000). People’s self-reported happiness, by
global measures, is greatly affected by their position in the economic
hierarchy rather than by their absolute wealth. Apparently those who
are in a high position, in a relevant hierarchy, impose positional exter-
nalities on others, causing hedonic damage (Frank 2000). By contrast,
signiﬁcant shifts in absolute economic position produce little or no he-
donic change. From existing evidence, it is odd but not implausible to
say that if the gross domestic product (GDP) of America or France
doubled in some period of years, we would not pick up any increase in
people’s life satisfaction. (Return to the case of China.) This conclusion
seems counterintuitive but on reﬂection may not be: Do we really believe
that people now living are much happier than people who lived (say) 5
decades earlier and that those who lived 5 decades earlier were happier
than those who preceded them? Even when GDP grows every decade,
does subjective well-being grow correspondingly? Recall the importance
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of attention to people’s well-being. Those whohave relativelylessmoney,
and inferior goods and services, are likely to focus on that fact. But if
everyone has more money, and better goods and services, people are less
likely to attend to the improvement. The problem, for those who believe
that subjective well-being is our lodestar, is that existing evidence sug-
gests that economic growth is not a good way to increase national well-
being.
I have noted that some people believe that what matters is not global
measures of happiness but measures of moment-by-moment happiness.
Perhaps global measures are a crude way of capturing what really mat-
ters, which is happiness as it is actually experienced (see Kahneman et
al. 2004). But even if this is so, absolute income is a poor measure of
moment-by-moment happiness; across a certain threshold, there is no
evidence that wealth is correlated with positive affect or with an absence
of negative affect (see Kahneman et al. 2004, 2007). Even relative eco-
nomic position, though correlated with global measures,isnotcorrelated
with measures of moment-by-moment happiness (Kahneman et al.
2004)—ﬁndings that again suggest the importance of attention. We
might therefore conclude that whether global or moment-by-moment
measures are the appropriate guide, economic growth does not much
matter to people’s welfare.
But there is an important qualiﬁcation. From the discussion thus far,
it should be clear that self-reported happiness is not the only thing that
is important, even if welfare, properly understood, is our lodestar. Hap-
piness may not increase with growth in GDP, but one result of GDP
growth may well be increases in longevity, health, and opportunity.
11
From the standpoint of increasing human welfare, it is good to enable
people to live 80 healthy years than 40 less healthy years, even if their
level of daily happiness does not increase. If increases in GDP are cor-
related with longer and healthier lives, and with better opportunities
and greater education, such increases appear to promote welfare even
if subjective happiness stays constant. Recall here the view that capa-
bilities have independent importance. To the extent that increases in
GDP increase literacy, promote health, and ensure greater opportunity,
they are valuable whatever happens to subjective happiness.
This point receives indirect support from some intriguing differences
11. For discussion, see Sen (1985). Sen argues that the concern should be capabilities,
not economic growth, but it is nonetheless true that growth is (imperfectly) correlated with
improvements in capabilities.
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between measures of global life satisfaction and measures of moment-
by-moment happiness. For example, global life satisfaction is positively
affected by whether one is married, has children, or is wealthy—but
moment-by-moment happiness is not. (In fact, divorced women report
both lower life satisfaction and higher moment-by-moment happiness
than married women; see Kahneman et al. 2004.) It is tempting to think
that the moment-by-moment measures are more accurate, because they
are more reliable than global measures, which seem to be a stab in the
dark. Consider the fact that experimenters can easily prime those who
answer general questions about happiness or life satisfaction, for ex-
ample, by asking them ﬁrst how many dates they have had in the past
month (see Kahneman and Krueger 2006). Such questions signiﬁcantly
affect reported life satisfaction. Perhaps those who are not speciﬁcally
primed engage in a kind of self-priming, asking certain questions (am I
married, do I have children, or am I wealthy?) in a way that produces
inaccurate measures of how happy they are in fact. On this view,
moment-by-moment measures are far better; if people are saddened by
asking questions about their global life satisfaction, their sadness should
matter only to the extent that it shows up in their actual experience.
On a different view, however, global measures produce not inaccurate
proxies but more reﬂective judgments, in which people assess how well
their lives are actually going. It is easy to imagine somewhat negative
answers to that question despite high levels of moment-by-moment hap-
piness, produced by hedonically good lives in which people see friends
a great deal, have long vacations, and greatly enjoy their days. Such
people might nonetheless conclude that their lives are not particularly
satisfying, perhaps because they lack depth or meaning. Similarly, it is
easy to imagine highly positive reactions to global life satisfaction ques-
tions despite not-high levels of moment-by-moment happiness. The high
levels of life satisfaction and the not-high levels of moment-by-moment
happiness might be produced by lives in which people work hard, serve
others, and have a great deal of stress.
I am not insisting that, in fact, most people are giving reﬂective an-
swers to questions about global life satisfaction, offering a mixture of
judgments about their moods, their capabilities, and their assignments
of meaning. What is clear is that even if social gains along various
dimensions do not register on either global or moment-by-moment mea-
sures, they should nonetheless count as gains; consider a population that
is better educated, signiﬁcantly healthier, and given more options about
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what to do with their lives. If economic growth produces those gains,
it is valuable even if it does not have signiﬁcant hedonic effects.
But if the goal really is welfare, we might pursue the relevant ends
directly and focus on economic growth only to the extent that it is
responsible or a good proxy for the relevant improvements. If the evi-
dence on subjective happiness is taken seriously, the consequences for
law and policy would appear to be signiﬁcant, because economic growth
would be demoted to a secondary matter, to be promoted only to the
extent that it helps achieve primary goals, which might in any case be
pursued directly (see Kahneman and Krueger 2006, pp. 18–21).
A Note on Meaning. I have mentioned the idea of meaning, and that idea
deserves independent analysis. If someone loses cognitive capacities, the
loss is not only one of a capability; his life also becomes less meaningful.
And if someone is usually in a good mood, perhaps because life is con-
stantly fun, he might nonetheless think, on reﬂection, that his activities
are superﬁcial or even silly and that something is missed by moment-
by-moment measures of his moods. A global life satisfaction question
might, in principle, pick up this concern, but perhaps people take that
question in hedonic terms. And even if an absence of meaning is not
reﬂected in people’s answers to survey questions or to subjectively felt
experience, it nonetheless matters; much ﬁction, most prominently Al-
dous Huxley’s Brave New World, explores that point. Perhaps some
damage awards can be justiﬁed as reﬂecting meaning loss (though here
again monetization is extremely difﬁcult).
Whether or not this is so, we can now see an additional difﬁculty
with purely hedonic measures. Those who are always in happy moods
may nonetheless be missing an important ingredient of well-being. Hap-
piness, understood in hedonic terms, does matter a great deal, but well-
being includes heterogeneous and plural goods.
CONCLUSION
In many contexts, the legal system requires people to make difﬁcult
hedonic judgments. If people make serious hedonic judgment errors in
their own lives, it is highly likely that juries and judges will make equiv-
alent errors. In particular, there is a serious risk that adjudicative insti-
tutions will signiﬁcantly overestimate the hedonic losses associated with
certain injuries. The exaggerations stem in part from a failure to ap-
preciate people’s powers of adaptation (adaptation neglect); they also
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stem from the kind of focusing illusion that people demonstrate when
thinking about the effects of weather. Often apparently signiﬁcant losses
turn out to be illusory, at least if they are understood in hedonic terms.
There are two particular implications. The ﬁrst is that those involved
in awarding damages must clearly distinguish between those injuries that
involve persistent harm and those injuries that do not. Some injuries fall
within the same category as unpleasant noises, to which people do not
adapt and on which people cannot help but focus; other injuries, such
as the loss of toes, inﬂict little hedonic harm. The second implication is
that capability damages deserve independent analysis. Even if little or
no hedonic loss is suffered, it is reasonable to conclude that people
deserve to be compensated in the event of a loss or serious injury to
capabilities.
I have suggested that the legal system now suffers from serious prob-
lems in making hedonic judgments and in translating hedonic and ca-
pability losses into monetary equivalents. The natural response is a set
of civil damages guidelines, incorporating sensible assessments of mon-
etization, the best available information about hedonic effects, and re-
ﬂective judgments about capability losses.
It should be clear that these points have implications for how policy-
makers might think about a range of questions outside of the domain
of adjudication. These include the limits of the willingness-to-pay cri-
terion, the value of national income growth, and appropriate priority
setting for governments concerned to improve social well-being. The
minimal conclusion is that if hedonic states matter, governments should
give far higher priority than they now do to the relief of mental illness
and chronic pain.
12 More generally, it would not be surprising if gov-
ernments make signiﬁcant hedonic judgment errors in ﬁscal and regu-
latory policy. If so, efforts to correct the resulting errors would produce
major welfare gains.
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